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Introduction to UKERC 
The UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) carries out world-class, interdisciplinary 
research into sustainable future energy systems. 
It is a focal point of UK energy research and a gateway between the UK and the 
international energy research communities. 
Our whole systems research informs UK policy development and research strategy. 
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Theme 4, ‘Energy infrastructure transitions’, of the current phase of UKERC 
considers the challenges associated with the transition to a net zero energy system, 
and how the necessary infrastructure to support this transition will be delivered. 
The term ‘infrastructure’ is not well defined and at its broadest can include 
institutional, personal and material elements and the network between them (Buhr, 
2003). Like the UK’s National Infrastructure Commission, our focus is primarily on 
material elements of infrastructure (National Infrastructure Comission, 2020) and our 
specific focus is those elements associated with the energy system. Unlike the NIC, 
we do take an active interest in housing because of its centrality to heat 
decarbonisation.   
This paper considers the issue of infrastructure governance associated with the UK’s 
transition towards an ultra-low carbon energy system in line with the net zero 
emissions goal. It is clear that significant changes to infrastructure are needed as 
fossil fuel combustion technologies are replaced with low carbon alternatives. Yet the 
required speed and scale of these changes imply radical reforms to how the energy 
(infrastructure) transformation is delivered.  
In this paper we consider what ‘governance’ is and the role it currently plays in the 
energy system. We then go on to consider the various approaches to infrastructure 
governance before proposing our next research steps.  
1.1 Why governance? 
In their review of ‘global energy governance’ issues, Florini and Sovacool (2009) 
explain that ‘Governance refers to any of the myriad processes through which a 
group of people set and enforce the rules needed to enable that group to achieve 
desired outcomes’ (p5240). Governance therefore goes well beyond a traditional 
narrow policy focus on the details and performance of specific instruments but 
broadens the focus to consider not just specific policies but the social, political and 
institutional context in which they sit and how they might develop over time. 
Adapting North’s famous definition of institutions (North, 1992), the recently 
completed IGov project which focussed on UK energy governance suggested 
‘governance is taken to mean policies, institutions, rules and incentives (i.e. the rules 
of the game)’ (Mitchell et al., 2016, p3). An even broader definition suggested 
‘Governing can be considered as the totality of interactions, in which public as well 
as private actors participate, aimed at solving societal problems or creating societal 
opportunities’ (Kooiman, 2003, p3). 
Clearly, governance is a wide subject covering a multitude of institutions, actors and 
processes fundamentally tied together by ideas of authority, power and decision-
making. In an attempt to make sense of some of this complexity, Howlett (2009) 
argues that how governance is implemented is driven by broad ideological choices 




Government believes that market forces are the most effective way to deliver policy 
outcomes, then policy design and implementation is likely to focus on economic 
measures design to deliver the desired outcomes in cost effective, often competitive 
ways.  Different ideological starting points will favour different policy outcomes.  We 
adopt this broad approach when considering different potential governance 
arrangements in Section 3. 
 
Figure 1. Modes of governance (Howlett, 2009, p77) 
Scholars suggested over a decade ago that energy governance in the UK, which had 
focused on privatisation, may not be suitable for the governance of a sustainable 
energy transition (Smith, 2009) in part because of an institutional focus on and 
expertise around liberalisation (Mitchell, 2007). Meanwhile, some areas of the UK 
energy system, such as elements of electricity generation, have taken a path 
towards geographical decentralisation as renewable electricity generation, much of 
which is connected to the distribution network, has expanded. Further change in this 
direction may mean that governance, or elements of it, may need to decentralise 
alongside energy systems (Goldthau, 2014).  
Over the past decade, little appears to have changed to how energy in the UK is 
governed and also how energy governance works across political scales. This is 
despite a rapidly changing political and technological landscape.  
In the following sections we focus on the Governmental elements of governance in 
the UK. We also recognise the potential for much wider societal involvement in 
governance. In particular we recognise calls for energy governance to be 
increasingly democratic and inclusive which could entail a greater focus on citizen 
outcomes, participatory decision making and more civic ownership of the energy 




sub-national citizen assemblies and juries. However, for the sake of maintaining a 
sensible research scope, we focus on Government elements of governance.  
1.2 Current energy and climate governance in the 
UK 
The Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council funded two stage ‘IGov’ 
project described existing GB energy governance institutions, these governance 
arrangements are shown in Figure 2. In this framework, various Government 
departments, some with their own advisory bodies, sit below parliamentary 
authorities. Ofgem, regulator of gas and electricity markets and networks, forms the 
key governance link to the private sector which owns the vast majority of the physical 
assets associated with the GB energy system. 
 
Figure 2. GB Energy governance: current institutions and responsibilities (Mitchell et al., 2019) 
The IGov project proposed a number of significant changes to the current 
institutional structure of energy governance in the UK including a new ‘Energy 
Transformation Commission’ which could co-ordinate and develop consensus across 
the existing institutions as well as reducing the remit of Ofgem from policy delivery to 
economic regulation and moving gas and electricity system operators into public 
ownership. Full details of the proposals can be found in Mitchell et al., (2019) which 




Building on the IGov work, this paper focuses specifically on the potential changes 
that may be required to the governance of energy infrastructure in the UK in light of 
the target for net zero emissions by 2050. In order to support this analysis, and using 
the framework highlighted through IGov, the following sections consider the current 
power and authority to develop policy and make decision that are relevant to energy 
infrastructure in the UK. 
1.2.1  UK Parliamentary sovereignty  
The supreme power in the UK’s political system to create and modify legislation sits 
within the UK parliament1; primary legislation can only be created or changed if 
agreed to by a majority in both the House of Commons and Lords (Parliament, 
2020a). Secondary or ‘subordinate’ legislation, often referred to as ‘statutory 
instruments’ which often contains the detailed elements of laws and relate to primary 
legislation must also pass both Houses of Parliament although this process is more 
passive - not all secondary legislation requires active approval by politicians 
(Parliament, 2020b). 
While parliament may have the deciding vote on legislation and can amend 
legislation as it sees fit, the majority of what become successful laws (initially 
referred to as draft laws, or ‘bills’) are introduced by the Government in power and 
these bills tend to be led by Government departments. Back bench (non-
government) MPs can introduce so-called private members’ bills but these are much 
less likely to become laws than Government sponsored bills in part because the 
Government can control timings of Parliament (Parliament, 2020c). 
1.2.2  Central Government authority 
Despite attempts at decentralisation, political power in the UK remains much more 
centralised than other similar economies (Institute for Government, 2014). The Prime 
Minister ‘is responsible for the overall organisation of the executive and the allocation 
of functions between ministers’ (Cabinet Office, 2011, p26) and is therefore able to 
set the agenda and shape of Government and its various departments.  
Below the Prime Minister, HM Treasury is responsible for overall control of 
Government spending and therefore has the de facto power of veto on all 
Government departmental spending decisions. As has been shown through the 
development of the ‘Levy Control Framework’, the Treasury’s economic authority can 
also cover levies raised on energy bills as well as direct Government spending 
(House of Commons Library, 2017). 
Beneath the authority of the Prime Minister and HM Treasury, but still within central 
Government, near total energy authority sits in three Government departments. 
‘Energy’ is currently covered by the remit of the Department for Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy (BEIS). Authority for the policy associated with English 
                                            
1 Technically the Head of State, currently the Queen can block all legislation as all primary legislation needs to 




buildings’ standards sits with the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local 
Government (MCHLG)2. While not directly considered as an energy department, the 
Department for Transport (DfT) is responsible for all issues associated with transport 
at a UK level. 
It is also worth noting that the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA) is responsible for climate change adaptation and some energy related 
elements of waste management such as incineration, with elements of anaerobic 
digestion also covered by its remit in England. Many of these policy functions are 
devolved. 
Other departments may also be involved in energy issues in less significant ways, 
one such example may be health and safety issues such as those associated with 
gas infrastructure; these issues sit under the Department for Work and Pensions 
(HM Government, 2020a). 
1.2.3  Devolution 
While still sitting under the overall legal authority of the UK parliament, the nations of 
the UK have seen some significant powers devolved to them. It should be noted that 
the authority for devolution and the ability to further or reverse it sits with the UK 
parliament. 
Under current devolution agreements, the Northern Ireland Executive has near total 
authority of energy issues with only nuclear energy issues an ‘excepted’ matter 
(House of Commons Library, 2020a).  
The Scottish Parliament has less authority over energy issues than the Northern 
Ireland Executive. In Scotland, while in general, electricity, oil and gas, coal and 
nuclear energy are ‘reserved’ issues, certain exceptions meaning some power has 
been devolved over energy issues (The Scottish Parliament, 2020). Further powers 
have also been devolved to Scotland under the 2016 Scotland Act with the Scottish 
Government now also able to legislate on issues of heat, energy efficiency and 
buildings policy but with market and consumer protection issues still reserved 
(Scottish Government, 2019).  The government has set out its own strategy for 
energy system development up to 2050 (Scottish Government, 2017).  
Wales is in a similar situation to how Scotland was before the further devolution of 
authority in 2016 with the headline energy issues of electricity, oil and gas, coal, 
nuclear energy and heat and cooling fundamentally reserved matters (National 
Assembly for Wales, 2020). Some specific exceptions exist which are detailed in the 
2017 Wales Act (Parliament, 2017). 
Authority over energy governance could of course be devolved further and local 
authorities have been recognised as potentially important actors in relation to change 
(e.g. Smith, 2007; Tingey et al., 2017). Tingey et al (2017) highlighted local authority 
                                            
2 Devolved nations each have their own policies and procedures for the development of buildings regulations 




engagement in energy but showed that capacity in local authorities for major and 
strategic involvement was limited. More recently, however, energy knowledge and 
capacity has been suggested to be increasing in English local authorities even at a 
time of economic austerity (Kuzemko and Britton, 2020).  
There are of course variations across local authorities, in part in relation to national 
devolution described previously. Following trials, the Scottish Government is now 
considering mandating the production of local heat and energy efficiency strategies 
(LHEES) for local areas (Wade et al., 2019). City scale plans may also exist and one 
example is London which has some energy authority over rules for planning and new 
buildings (Greater London Authority, 2020). 
Cleary, with varying levels of devolution to UK nations and the potential for further 
devolution to local authorities, existing multi-level energy governance in the UK is 
complex and as a result, complex governance interactions exist. Yet as Cowell et al. 
(2017) show, the strategies for, and the (varying) deployment of, renewable 
electricity at national levels has depended on UK wide financial support and policies. 
1.2.4  Government energy bodies and advisors 
Ofgem, the regulator of wholesale markets, networks, suppliers and system 
operators, remains a non-ministerial Government department with an independent 
board but subject to the rules and direction of BEIS. The 2010 Energy Act gave 
Ofgem a duty to take into account ‘future’ consumer issues and explicitly referred to 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (HM Government, 2010), and the 2013 Energy 
Act provided a route for Government to prescribe a strategy and policy for Ofgem 
through a so-called ‘Strategy and Policy Statement’ (SPSS) (DECC, 2014). 
However, despite a Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) consultation 
in 2014, a final statement has never been issued leaving Ofgem with only limited 
‘social and environmental guidance’ issued by DECC in 2011 as a basis for 
environmental and social decision making (Mitchell, 2018). While a recent 
‘decarbonisation action plan’ has suggested some steps for Ofgem to support net 
zero goals, specific details have not been published (OFGEM, 2020). 
The Committee on Climate Change (CCC), an executive non-departmental public 
body, is statutory climate advisor to the UK Government and is enabled through the 
2008 Climate Change Act (Parliament, 2008). It has not had its functions modified 
since its inception although its advice and analysis is now aligned with the UK’s ‘net 
zero’ goal for 2050 (rather than the previous 80% on 1990 level GHG reduction 
target). The CCC advised on the net zero target which is now included in an 
amended version of the Climate Change Act. The Government is legally required to 
respond to the CCC’s advice, though it is not obliged to act on it. 
While not solely energy or climate focused, the ‘National Infrastructure Commission’ 
(NIC) is an executive agency of HM Treasury that operates ‘independently, at arm’s 
length from government’ advising on infrastructure issues (HM Government, 2017a, 




it should be (Institute for Government, 2017) but Government is expected to respond 
to the recommendations of the NIC (HM Government, 2017a). 
1.3 Section summary 
This section has outlined the shape of energy governance in the UK in particular 
considering how energy infrastructure is governed. Energy governance in the UK is 
complex and takes place across many levels of government but much authority 
remains centralised. While some decentralisation of power has taken place, further 
decentralisation may be required in order to support decarbonisation. 
2. The infrastructure challenge 
Despite significant progress in UK electricity system decarbonisation associated with 
the deployment of renewables and the removal of coal generation, decarbonisation 
of buildings and transport remains limited (Committee on Climate Change, 2019a). In 
fact, overall, emissions from transport have increased slightly and emissions from 
buildings, while seeing some reduction since 1990 have recently stalled (see Figure 
3). 
 
Figure 3. Trends in sectoral greenhouse gas emissions (Committee on Climate Change, 2019a) 
Transport, industry and buildings are now the largest emission sectors in the UK and 
the UK’s goal for net zero implies total decarbonisation of these sectors by 2050. 
Across these sectors, the need for a significant increase in the scale of certain 
infrastructures appears apparent. 
Across all sectors, a significant proportion of electrification seems to be needed but 





The potential technologies to decarbonise industry depend on the particular 
industrial process. Some of the most detailed analysis on industrial heat 
decarbonisation pathways was released by the UK Government in 2015 and created 
pathways for the eight largest industrial sectors, which cover two thirds of industrial 
greenhouse gas emissions. An outline of different industries and potential 
decarbonisation options is shown below in Figure 4 (Parsons Brinckerhoff and DNV 
GL, 2015). 
 
Figure 4. Potential reductions and technology options for the decarbonisation of key UK industrial sectors (Parsons 




Reflecting the technologies shown in Figure 4, Cooper and Hammond (2018) 
recognise that four technological categorisations cover the key industrial 
decarbonisation technologies for the UK.  
 Energy efficiency; 
 Bio-energy or hydrogen; 
 Carbon capture and storage (possibly alongside bio-energy and hydrogen); 
 Electrification based around low carbon electricity. 
Cooper and Hammond (2018) 
 
The authors do, however, recognise that novel policy and financial instruments will 
be required to support the deployment of these technologies (Cooper and 
Hammond, 2018).  
The CCC also recognised these four technology options in its net zero report but 
also includes the need to reduce fugitive methane emissions (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2019b). 
2.2 Transport 
As shown below in Figure 5, 91% of the UK’s transport emissions come from road 
transport making it the key segment where emission reductions are needed 
(Department for Transport, 2019). Electrification is widely seen as the key approach 
to the decarbonisation of much existing fossil fuelled transport with the CCC 
suggesting all cars and vans need to be electric by 2050 and HGVs should be 
powered by either hydrogen or electricity; increasing levels of walking and cycling 
are also needed (Committee on Climate Change, 2019b). 
 





Clearly a transformation to electrified transport will require major expansion in 
charging facilities. Currently, however, there is no regulation to mandate the 
deployment of charging infrastructure although public funds are available to support 
the installation of charge points at home and in public areas (House of Commons 
Library, 2020b). 
2.3 Heat and buildings 
Despite a widely perceived need for mass electrification of heating in buildings 
alongside reductions in demand, pathways for heat (space and hot water) 
decarbonisation have become more complex with options for decarbonised gas 
(hydrogen) alongside or potentially combined with electrification. The UK 
Government’s Clean Growth Strategy contains pathways with high levels of 
hydrogen or electrification (HM Government, 2017b).  
The CCC has suggested that a full hydrogen pathway which replaces all gas 
demand used for heat with hydrogen may not be sensible. Instead, a very large level 
of electrification will be needed alongside the possibility of hybrid heating systems 
where hydrogen is combusted at times of peak demand (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2018). 
It should be noted that the Clean Growth Strategy pathways also contain a 
significant increase in the scale of district heating in the UK, increasing to 17% of 
domestic heating in all scenarios and between 17 and 24% in non-industrial 
business use and in the public sector (HM Government, 2017b). The CCC suggests 
that around 5 million homes (around 19% of the number of current homes3) should 
be connected to heat networks with low carbon sources of heat in 2050 (Committee 
on Climate Change, 2019c). This potential growth is a significant increase from 
current levels of around 2% of total heat consumption (BEIS, 2018). 
2.4 The size of the infrastructure and investment 
challenge 
Major investment across all energy sectors will be required if the net zero goal is to 
be met with cost estimates ranging from £50 to £70 billion per annum although there 
is some disagreement over this between the CCC and HM Treasury (New Scientist, 
2020). The Treasury is currently conducting a review into the funding of the transition 
to a net zero economy (HM Treasury, 2019). The three sectors considered in the 
previous section all show a need for significant change to how energy is provided in 
response to decarbonisation. Some key possibilities for technological change have 
emerged: 
1. Increases in energy efficiency; 
                                            
3 Based on ONS statistics on 2017 UK household numbers 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/families/adhocs/005374




2. Electrification of services currently provided by fossil fuels; 
3. The use of hydrogen for some industrial processes and a potential role in 
goods transport and heating; 
4. An increase in the use of district heating. 
These changes all suggest significant implications for infrastructure in the UK with 
the potential for: 
1. Mass upgrades/electrification transformation of buildings; 
2. Increases in electricity generation capacity; 
3. Increases in electricity network capacity; 
4. The conversion of (parts of) the gas network to hydrogen alongside the 
potential for decommissioning of parts of the gas network; 
5. An expansion in the scale of district heating. 
The 2018 National Infrastructure Assessment recognised a number of these issues, 
and in particular highlighted the need for immediate energy efficiency and renewable 
electricity deployment (National Infrastructure Commission, 2018). The assessment, 
however, made no mention of district heating and suggested more research on heat 
was required before major decisions could be made but it explained ‘In the 2020s, 
decisions will be required on whether the gas network should be maintained and 
converted, or phased out’ (p44). 
The CCC’s net zero review suggested net zero could be achieved by 2050 at a cost 
(compared to doing nothing) of between 1 and 2% of UK GDP; the two largest 
sectors for investment are the electricity sector which requires around a doubling of 
investment from current levels to £20 billion per year and around £10 billion a year 
for low-carbon heating (Committee on Climate Change, 2019b). Interestingly, 
electrification of transport is seen as a positive cost overall although increased 
investment in the electricity sector will be needed for charging and capacity. 
According to the CCC, overall an increase in capital investment up to around 1% of 
GDP in 2050 is needed; 1% of 2019 GDP is around £22 billion per year4.  
In its assessment of heat decarbonisation costs, the National Infrastructure 
Commission suggested that in a decarbonised world heating costs would be less 
that today in real terms, but between £120 billion and £300 billion (central case) of 
additional costs would be required between now and 2050 (Element Energy and 
E4tech, 2018). These figures for heat are similar but slightly lower than those costs 
suggested by the CCC, likely reflecting the fact that the NIC analysis resulted in 
some residual emissions from the heat sector as it was prior to the introduction of the 
net zero target. 
As shown below, Government figures suggest annual investment in the UK’s energy 
system is currently around £19 billion per year with the majority (60%) of this in the 
electricity sector. It is, however, apparent that not all energy investment is 
considered in this figure, for example transport and energy efficiency does not 
feature. It should be noted that trade body Energy UK uses a slightly lower number 
                                            





with £13.1 billion invested in 2018 (Energy UK, 2020). Either way, the net zero target 
implies both an increased level of investment and increased investment in sectors 
which currently see only limited investment. 
 
Figure 6. Annual investment in the UK energy industries (Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2019a) 
In light of questions over the appropriateness of energy governance in response to 
the requirement for energy system transition and the scale of infrastructure 
investment needed, this paper now goes on to review potential approaches for the 





3. Approaches to infrastructure 
governance 
There is no one-size-fits-all best approach to how infrastructure and in particular 
energy infrastructure should be governed. In fact, as highlighted previously, the 
complex nature of the idea of governance and the fact it encompasses wide political 
structures and ideas and societal elements means that the style of governance and 
choices made about the means of delivering energy infrastructure outcomes will vary 
according to different political and ideological starting points. 
 
The literature focusing specifically on the governance of energy infrastructure is 
relatively sparse and there does not appear to be a unified or co-ordinated research 
theme in this area. This allows our analysis to attempt to bring a broad and disparate 
literature together. Based on a wide ranging literature review, this section considers 
the key themes associated with the governance of infrastructure. 
3.1 State versus private ownership 
Debates around whether energy infrastructure should be owned by the public sector 
or the private sector have been taking place for decades. While Governments can 
(generally) get hold of lower cost finance than private companies, the value of private 
ownership is primarily associated with the potential for efficiency savings and 
cheaper alternatives by the private sector, encouraged by the profit motive and a 
better ability to innovate (Boyfield, 1992). Certain risks may also be managed better 
by public or private sector actors depending on existing skills and expertise (Ng and 
Loosemore, 2007). Concerns over reduced competition associated with public 
ownership could potentially be managed through the use of tendering for products 
and services. 
Rightly or wrongly, the sale of British Coal, British Energy, British Gas, British 
Nuclear Fuels Limited, British Petroleum, Britoil and the various electricity boards 
(House of Commons Library, 2014) moved the ownership of much of the UK’s 
energy infrastructure from state into private hands. The UK became the first country 
to privatise a complete electricity system (House of Commons Library, 2014), an 
approach which has been described in part as ‘experimental’ (Vickers et al., 2020). 
While the vast majority of UK energy infrastructure is now privately owned, proposals 
were made by the official (unsuccessful) opposition during the last election period to 
re-nationalise gas and electricity networks (Labour Party, 2019). While large scale 
re-nationalisations are rare, commentators have pointed out that Labour’s proposals 
could have allowed a level of state involvement in energy infrastructure currently 
seen in many countries (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2019).  
Although often controversial and highly politicised, the required scale and speed of 
UK decarbonisation suggests that greater state (UK-wide and devolved 
administration) involvement may be required; whether that could involve any 




considered how the UK’s liberal market based approaches may be less suited to the 
development of heat networks compared to the more coordinated political-
economies of Norway and the Netherlands (Hawkey and Webb, 2014). 
Models exist where infrastructure sits between fully private and fully state ownership 
and control. Indeed, while the UK energy infrastructure may be owned privately, 
energy remains a heavily regulated sector. Non-ministerial government department 
Ofgem currently issues licenses which allow certain energy infrastructure owners 
and businesses to operate, regulates the performance and income of monopoly 
network companies and works to enhance competition. Overall, it may be the case 
that changes to regulation could provide similar outcomes to what nationalisation is 
expected by some, to be able to achieve. 
3.2 Public/private partnership models 
Approaches exist whereby infrastructure can be managed and/or delivered by the 
private sector but under the close control of Governments. So-called public private 
partnerships (PPPs) can remove the need for Government finance from projects as 
projects are financed by the private sector but allow Government control through 
contracting for services or outputs (Brown, 2007). This approach can of course shift 
elements of risk between actors with for example demand risk being taken on by 
Governments. However, it’s argued that the Government balance sheet benefits of 
PPPs (freeing up cash) may not be material and so the value of PPPs is primarily on 
the grounds of potential efficiency (Engel et al., 2010).  
The historic use of PPP approaches in the UK has often been referred to as Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) and data on projects shows that this approach has mainly 
been used for schools and hospitals; it should be noted some ‘energy to waste’ 
projects have used a PPP model (HM Government, 2020b). Following concerns over 
value and service, the Government announced in the 2018 budget that the PFI (or 
more recent PF2) approach would no longer be used (HM Treasury, 2018).  
3.3 Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) approaches 
While PPP approaches are not currently seen by the UK Government as a useful 
option to deliver infrastructure, some have suggested that the inflexibility of PPP 
approaches could be overcome using RAB based approaches.  
Energy network infrastructure in the UK is regulated based on a regulatory asset 
base model (RAB) whereby returns are linked to asset values, and investment and 
income are tightly controlled by regulator Ofgem. Statutory consumer watchdog 
Citizens Advice (2017) has, however, highlighted issues with network regulation and 
concerns over excessive profits. 
There are also other potential issues with RAB models: 
 Difficulties in assessing actual asset value; 




 Initial procurement of projects; 
 A lean towards capital expenditure rather than operational expenditure. 
 
(Meaney and Hope, 2012) 
The use of the RAB model in the UK is primarily associated with governing existing 
infrastructure. While RAB approaches can be used to deliver new infrastructure, it’s 
not clear that this approach offers any efficiency advantages to PPP models (Dejan 
Makovšek and Veryard, 2016). Combinations of PPP approaches and RAB 
approaches may have value although the use of this model in practice is limited.  
It’s notable that the UK Government consulted last year on the idea of using a RAB 
model to deliver new nuclear power stations, suggesting this would be a similar 
approach to the Thames Tideway Tunnel. Through reducing risk for those 
constructing nuclear plants, this model was suggested to be able to reduce the cost 
of financial capital behind new nuclear power stations therefore potentially reducing 
the final cost for consumers (Department for Business Energy and Industrial 
Strategy, 2019b). However, the reduction of risk for constructors of new nuclear plant 
simply moves this risk to consumers/tax payers and so unless the economic 
regulation of plant built under the RAB model was extremely accurate, it’s not clear 
consumers would see any benefit from this model (NERA, 2020). The Government 
has not yet responded to the consultation. 
3.4 Market delivery 
Large capital requirements and long asset lives mean that infrastructure has often 
been seen to require some sort of government intervention. It’s worth noting that 
historically this hasn’t been the case with gas systems developed by private sector 
actors (Arapostathis et al., 2013) and much of the UK’s railway originally built by 
businesses (Shaw-taylor and Xuesheng, 2018). 
In the UK electricity sector, following privatisation, non-renewable and non-nuclear 
electricity generation was delivered based on the electricity market with generation 
being built to match supply. In the 1990s, around 20GW of new combined cycle gas 
turbines (CCGTs) were built in response to the expected closure of coal and nuclear 
stations and the expectation of tightening capacity margins (DECC, 2012) alongside 
the removal of European Community rules which blocked the use of gas for power 
generation (EUCERS, 2017). 
Gas generation can be delivered relatively quickly and global technological 
developments supported the deployment of CCGTs in the UK (Kern, 2012). 
Therefore, for UK electricity generation, this expansion of gas generation capacity 
may have been a unique occurrence. The recent growth in UK renewable electricity 
capacity has been supported by specific policies including the renewables obligation 
and the feed in tariff and more recently contracts for difference. The capacity market 
mechanism was also specifically expected by government to support new gas 
generation plant suggesting the market was no longer seen as able to support it 




3.5 Section overview 
There is no one approach to the governance of energy infrastructure in the UK; 
however, multiple models exist and can be used. Indeed there are a broad spectrum 
of approaches which vary from ‘state build and ownership’ to ‘unregulated and free 
market’. Building on Howlett’s (2009) modes of governance approach outlined in 
Section 1, Error! Reference source not found. overleaf shows the various models 
which exist in the UK and where they might fit on a spectrum of political philosophy; 
it also provides some examples and suggests how these examples are built, 
managed and run.  
The variation highlighted in the table suggests that the development of governance is 
a messy, complex and in part random process which is in part defined by 
overarching political approaches to state involvement.  
In considering approaches to governance of infrastructure, institutional methods may 
have some value. In particular, historical institutional approaches may assist us in 
understanding how governance systems have developed over time and how historic 
decisions, approaches and ways of thinking shape and continue to impact policy and 
governance change (see Kuzemko et al, 2016). More recently developed ideational, 
institutional approaches may also shine some light on how ideas, particularly around 
thought paradigms and ideology have been incorporated in the development of 
policies and institutions (e.g Schmidt, 2010). 
The following and final section of this paper considers how we will apply some of the 









4. Conclusions and next steps 
With such major energy system changes required and clear infrastructure impacts, 
the next stages of our research will investigate current UK energy infrastructure 
governance, consider any infrastructure governance issues that could put 
decarbonisation at risk and then investigate potential solutions. 
We will focus on three infrastructure sectors which appear to be important areas for 
decarbonisation. These case studies are: 
Networks: this will focus on the governance of gas and electricity networks and the 
potential development of heat networks. 
Buildings: this will consider the idea of buildings as infrastructure noting the 
importance and lack of progress around heat decarbonisation. 
Offshore wind: this will focus on the potential for rapid growth in offshore wind as a 
result of cost reduction, the current government target and the importance of cross-
sector electrification and potential hydrogen production. 
While these case studies may not cover all areas of the UK energy system they are 
related to key areas including heat, transport and industry. We expect synthesis 
across case studies will allow general energy infrastructure governance issues to be 
highlighted and we also expect significant case study detail to emerge. 
For the ongoing research we plan the following steps: 
1. We plan to use governance mapping to map the policy/regulatory institutional 
structure associated with each of our case study areas. This mapping will 
highlight the role of various bodies in the governance of each case. 
2. For each case study, a number of semi-structured interviews will be used to: 
a. Test our governance mapping; 
b. Investigate concerns over existing governance associated with net 
zero; 
c. Consider proposals for infrastructure governance change; 
d. Consider historical and ideational institutional issues associated with 
UK infrastructure governance and what we may be able to learn from 
previous infrastructure successes and failures. 
Results from these case studies will be reported in an upcoming synthesis report, 
UKERC blogs and academic journal articles. We are also planning a project close-
out webinar. 
We would be extremely pleased to hear any feedback on the ideas in this paper and 






Arapostathis, S., Carlsson-Hyslop, A., Pearson, P.J.G., Thornton, J., Gradillas, M., Laczay, 
S., Wallis, S., 2013. Governing transitions: Cases and insights from two periods in the 
history of the UK gas industry. Energy Policy 52, 25–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2012.08.016 
BEIS, 2018. Energy Consumption in the UK [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/energy-consumption-in-the-uk 
Boyfield, K., 1992. Private sector funding of public sector infrastructure. Public Money 
Manag. 12, 41–46. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540969209387708 
Brown, K., 2007. Are Public–Private Transactions the Future of Infrastructure Finance? 
Public Work. Manag. Policy 12, 320–324. https://doi.org/10.1177/1087724X07303680 
Buhr, W., 2003. What is Infrastructure?, University of Siegen Working Paper. 
Cabinet Office, 2011. The Cabinet Manual. A guide to laws, conventions and rules on the 
operation of governement. 
Citizens Advice, 2017. Energy networks making £7.5bn in unjustified profit over 8 years, 
Citizens Advice finds [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.citizensadvice.org.uk/cymraeg/about-us/how-citizens-advice-
works/media/press-releases/energy-networks-making-75bn-in-unjustified-profit-over-8-
years-citizens-advice-finds/ (accessed 4.29.20). 
Committee on Climate Change, 2019a. Reducing UK emissions 2019 Progress Report to 
Parliament [WWW Document]. URL https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/reducing-uk-
emissions-2019-progress-report-to-parliament/ 
Committee on Climate Change, 2019b. Net Zero: The UK’s contribution to stopping global 
warming [WWW Document]. URL https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/Net-Zero-The-UKs-contribution-to-stopping-global-
warming.pdf 
Committee on Climate Change, 2019c. Net Zero Technical report [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Net-Zero-Technical-report-
CCC.pdf 
Committee on Climate Change, 2018. Hydrogen in a low-carbon economy [WWW 
Document]. URL https://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Hydrogen-in-
a-low-carbon-economy.pdf 
Cooper, S.J.G., Hammond, G.P., 2018. “Decarbonising” UK industry: Towards a cleaner 
economy. Proc. Inst. Civ. Eng. Energy 171, 147–157. 
https://doi.org/10.1680/jener.18.00007 
Cowell, R., Ellis, G., Sherry-Brennan, F., Strachan, P.A., Toke, D., 2017. Rescaling the 
Governance of Renewable Energy: Lessons from the UK Devolution Experience. J. 
Environ. Policy Plan. 19, 480–502. https://doi.org/10.1080/1523908X.2015.1008437 
DECC, 2014. Strategy and Policy Statement. London. 
DECC, 2012. Gas Generation Strategy. 
Dejan Makovšek, Veryard, D., 2016. The Regulatory Asset Base Model and the Project 









Department for Business Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2019b. Regulated Asset Base 
(RAB) model for nuclear [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/regulated-asset-base-rab-model-for-
nuclear (accessed 10.15.20). 
Department for Transport, 2019. Future of Mobility: Urban Strategy. 
Element Energy, E4tech, 2018. Cost analysis of future heat infrastructure options [WWW 
Document]. URL https://www.nic.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Element-Energy-and-
E4techCost-analysis-of-future-heat-infrastructure-Final.pdf 
Energy UK, 2020. Investment [WWW Document]. URL https://www.energy-uk.org.uk/energy-
industry/investment.html (accessed 9.29.20). 
Engel, E., Fischer, R., Galetovic, A., 2010. The economics of infrastructure finance: Public- 
private partnerships versus public provision. 
EUCERS, 2017. UK’s Dash for Gas: Implications for the role of natural gas in European 
power generation. London. 
Florini, A., Sovacool, B.K., 2009. Who governs energy? The challenges facing global energy 
governance. Energy Policy 37, 5239–5248. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.039 
Goldthau, A., 2014. Rethinking the governance of energy infrastructure: Scale, 
decentralization and polycentrism. Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 1, 134–140. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2014.02.009 
Greater London Authority, 2020. Energy Planning Guidance [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/planning/planning-applications-and-
decisions/pre-planning-application-meeting-service-0 (accessed 4.20.20). 
Hawkey, D., Webb, J., 2014. District energy development in liberalised markets: situating UK 
heat network development in comparison with Dutch and Norwegian case studies. 
Technol. Anal. Strateg. Manag. 26, 1228–1241. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09537325.2014.971001 
HM Government, 2020a. Departments, agencies and public bodies [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations#department-for-work-pensions 
(accessed 4.16.20). 
HM Government, 2020b. PFI and PF2 Projects [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/private-finance-initiative-and-private-
finance-2-projects-2017-summary-data (accessed 4.29.20). 
HM Government, 2017a. National Infrastructure Commission framework document. London. 
HM Government, 2017b. The Clean Growth Strategy: Leading the way to a low carbon 
future [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/651916/B
EIS_The_Clean_Growth_online_12.10.17.pdf 
HM Government, 2010. Energy Act 2010. London. 






HM Treasury, 2018. Budget 2018 [WWW Document]. URL 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachme
nt_data/file/752202/Budget_2018_red_web.pdf 
House of Commons Library, 2020a. Devolution in Northern Ireland, 1998 - 2020. London. 
House of Commons Library, 2020b. Electric Vehicles and Infrastructure Briefing Paper. 
House of Commons Library, 2017. Control for Low Carbon Levies. London. 
House of Commons Library, 2014. Privatisation [WWW Document]. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Howlett, M., 2009. Governance modes, policy regimes and operational plans: A multi-level 
nested model of policy instrument choice and policy design. Policy Sci. 42, 73–89. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-009-9079-1 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2019. Labour’s nationalisation policy [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/BN271-Labour%27s-nationalisation-policy.pdf 
Institute for Government, 2017. It’s time to put the National Infrastructure Commission on a 
statutory footing [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/lord-adonis-resignation-national-
infrastructure-commission (accessed 4.16.20). 
Institute for Government, 2014. Achieving Political Decentralisation. London. 
Kern, F., 2012. The development of the CCGT and the dash for gas in the UK power 
industry (1987 - 2007). London. 
Kooiman, J., 2003. Governing as Governance. Sage, London. 
Kuzemko, C., Britton, J., 2020. Policy, politics and materiality across scales: A framework for 
understanding local government sustainable energy capacity applied in England. 
Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 62, 101367. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.101367 
Kuzemko, C., Lockwood, M., Mitchell, C., Hoggett, R., 2016. Governing for sustainable 
energy system change: Politics, contexts and contingency. Energy Res. Soc. Sci. 12, 
96–105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2015.12.022 
Labour Party, 2019. Bringing Energy Home: Labour’s proposal for publicly owned energy 
networks [WWW Document]. URL https://www.labour.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/Bringing-Energy-Home-2019.pdf 
Lockwood, M., 2017. The development of the Capacity Market for electricity in Great Britain 
[WWW Document]. URL http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/igov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/WP-1702-Capacity-Market.pdf 
Meaney, A., Hope, P., 2012. Alternative Ways of Financing Infrastructure Investment: 
Potential for ‘Novel’ Financing Models. 
Mitchell, C., 2018. The Lost Strategy and Policy Statement: Is Ofgem Really Working to the 
2011 Social and Environmental Guidance? [WWW Document]. URL 
http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/igov/new-thinking-the-lost-strategy-and-policy-statement/ 
Mitchell, C., 2007. The Political Economy of Sustainable Energy. Palgrave Macmillan, 
Hampshire. 
Mitchell, C., Lockwood, M., Hoggett, R., Kuzemko, C., 2016. Governance for Innovation, 






Mitchell, C., Willis, R., Hoggett, R., Pownall, T., Lowes, R., Britton, J., 2019. The IGov 
institutional framework for energy governance: Co-ordinated national and local 
governance of electricity, heat and energy services [WWW Document]. URL 
https://projects.exeter.ac.uk/igov/new-thinking-the-igov-institutional-framework-for-
energy-governance/ (accessed 4.16.20). 
National Assembly for Wales, 2020. Powers [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.assembly.wales/en/abthome/role-of-assembly-how-it-
works/Pages/Powers.aspx (accessed 4.17.20). 
National Infrastructure Comission, 2020. What we do [WWW Document]. URL 
https://nic.org.uk/about/what-we-do/#:~:text=The Commission advises government 
on,risk management and digital communications.&text=Specific studies on pressing 
infrastructure challenges as set by government (accessed 9.28.20). 
National Infrastructure Commission, 2018. National Infrastructure Assessment 2018. 
London. 
NERA, 2020. A RAB Model for New Nuclear Power Plants: The Economics of Investment 
Incentives. 
New Scientist, 2020. UK Government refuses to explain cost of hitting net zero [WWW 
Document]. URL https://www.newscientist.com/article/2233899-uk-government-refuses-
request-to-explain-cost-of-hitting-net-zero/ (accessed 4.24.20). 
Ng, A., Loosemore, M., 2007. Risk allocation in the private provision of public infrastructure. 
Int. J. Proj. Manag. 25, 66–76. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2006.06.005 
North, D., 1992. Institutions, ideology and economic performance. Cato J. 11, 477. 
OFGEM, 2020. Ofgem Decarbonisation Action Plan. London. 
Parliament, 2020a. Parliament’s authority [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/sovereignty/ (accessed 4.16.20). 
Parliament, 2020b. What is secondary legislation? [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/secondary-legislation/ (accessed 4.16.20). 
Parliament, 2020c. Private members’ bills [WWW Document]. URL 
https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/laws/bills/private-members/ (accessed 4.16.20). 
Parliament, 2017. Wales Act 2017. 
Parliament, 2008. Climate Change Act 2008 [WWW Document]. URL 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/data.pdf 
Parsons Brinckerhoff and DNV GL, 2015. Industrial Decarbonisation & Energy Efficiency 
Roadmaps to 2050 - Cross sector summary. London. 
Schmidt, V. a., 2010. Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining change through 
discursive institutionalism as the fourth ‘new institutionalism.’ Eur. Polit. Sci. Rev. 2, 1. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S175577390999021X 
Scottish Government, 2019. Energy Efficient Scotland: the future of low carbon heat for off 
gas buildings - call for evidence. 
Scottish Government, 2017. Scottish energy strategy : the future of energy in Scotland. 
Shaw-taylor, L., Xuesheng, Y., 2018. The development of the railway network in Britain 




Wales c.1680-1911. URL 
https://www.geog.cam.ac.uk/research/projects/transport/onlineatlas/railways.pdf 
Smith, A., 2009. Energy Governance: The Challenges of Sustainability, in: Scrase, I., 
Mackerron, G. (Eds.), Energy for the Future: A New Agenda. Palgrave Macmillan, 
Hampshire. 
Smith, A., 2007. Emerging in between: The multi-level governance of renewable energy in 
the English regions. Energy Policy 35, 6266–6280. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2007.07.023 
Szulecki, K., 2018. Conceptualizing energy democracy. Env. Polit. 27, 21–41. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1387294 
The Scottish Parliament, 2020. What are the powers of the Scottish Parliament [WWW 
Document]. URL https://www.parliament.scot/visitandlearn/12506.aspx (accessed 
4.16.20). 
Tingey, M., Webb, J., Hawkey, D., 2017. Local Authority Engagement in UK Energy 
Systems: Highlights From Early Findings. Edinburgh. 
Vickers, J., Yarrow, G., Rochet, J., Venables, A., 2020. The British Electricity Experiment 6, 
187–232. https://doi.org/10.2307/1344452 
Wade, F., Webb, J., Creamer, E., 2019. Local Heat and Energy Efficiency Strategies: Phase 
1 Pilots - Social Evaluation Report - On behalf of the Scottish Government. Edinburgh. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
